"There are some injuries which, once committed, cannot be adequately redressed. The taking of life is an extreme case of this kind. Against the commission of such injuries, therefore, every person should not only have the protection of government, when practicable, but should also have a right to defend himself. The right of self-defence would of course exist in a state of nature, and the social compact does not take it away; but the right of avenging an injury already committed is taken away. This is a fundamental distinction. You may prevent an injury from being done, by all proper means; but when done, you may not take redress in your own hands. The social compact provides a tribunal to which you are bound to resort; and abundant provision is made for securing the redress to which you may be entitled. Thus the right of self-defence and the right of redress are two distinct things; but both are equally guaranteed by the constitution. We have already seen that "the enjoying and defending life and liberty," is declared to be an inalienable right. Also, "that the people have a right to bear arms for their defence and security." (b) In England, this right is qualified by the condition, that the arms must be suitable to the condition and degree of the bearer; but here, there is no qualification."
(a) See 2 Story, Const. 1896; 1 Black. Com. 148. [A party may use reasonable force to defend the possession of his property, but he cannot use force against the person in regaining or obtaining the possession of property to which he is entitled. 3 Black. Com. 4, 179; Sampson v. Henry, 11 Pick. 387; 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, 397; 1 Hilliard on Torts, ch. v. ss 12, pp 196, 197.]- Timothy Walker, LL.D, [INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW. DESIGNED AS A FIRST BOOK FOR STUDENTS. BY TIMOTHY WALKER LL.D. LATE PROFESSOR OF LAW IN THE CINCINATTI COLLEGE. FIFTH EDITION, REVISED BY J. BRYANT WALKER, OF THE CINCINNATI BAR. BOSTON: LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY 1869.]
(b) [This provision is not infringed by a statute prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons. State v. Jumel, 13 La. An. 399.]
(WALKER, Timothy, jurist, born in Wilmington, Massachusetts, 1 December, 1806 ; died in Cincinnati, Ohio, 15 January, 1856. He was graduated at Harvard in 1826, taught mathematics at the Round Hill school, Northampton, Massachusetts, in 1826-'9, studied at Harvard law-school in the latter year and in 1830, and removed to Cincinnati in 1831, where he was admitted to the bar and settled in practice. With Judge John C. Wright he established the Cincinnati law-school in 1833, and when in 1835 it was united with Cincinnati college he assumed entire charge of that department, and was professor of law there till 1844. He was president-judge of Hamilton county court of common pleas in 1842-'3, founded the "Western Law Journal" in 1843, and was its editor for several years, at the same time practising his profession. Harvard gave him the degree of LL. D. in 1854.)
It is self-evident that the right to arms is corollary to the Right to Self-Defense. Which of course is a natural right that can NEVER be surrendered, even after entering into society. It is a retained right that NO person can be deprived of by ANY law of man. Thus making the RESTRICTIVE clause found in the 2nd amendment; "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall NOT be infringed" abundantly clear in meaning.