10-3-1874: “So you see they say you are entitled to these “rights,” but that you shan’t have them. . . . ”

Gov. John C. Brown [Democrat], “That we favor a strict construction of the Constitution of the United States, and insist that no power should be exercised by the General Government that is not clearly delegated or clearly implied in the necessary exercise of the powers so delegated. No intelligent man will question the soundness of this doctrine. . . . the bill that proposes to put the African, who is my inferior . . . [Brown quoting Republicans: “every man’s house is his castle, and that under our Government every citizen, white or black, has the right to bear arms”] . . . [Gov. Brown speaking directly to a group of African Americans: “So you see they say you are entitled to these “rights,” but that you shan’t have them.”], Oct. 3, 1874

“Fire!“

“Fire!“

U.S. Senator J.R. West, [It’s not the exercise of a right that is subject to restraint, but the abuse that results from the misuse in the exercise of it.]

U.S. Senator J.R. West, “…the advantage of constitutional rights; so citizens have the right to bear arms, unless by so doing they endanger the peace and safety of their neighbors.” [It’s not the exercise of a right that is subject to restraint, but the abuse that results from the misuse in the exercise of it.], Oct. 2, 1874

   "To argue against the use of a thing from the abuse of it, had long since been exploded by all sensible people."--Hon. Edward Rutledge, (Later Governor of South Carolina),  Jan. 16, 1788, [Debates In The Legislature And In Convention Of The State Of South Carolina, On The Adoption Of The Federal Constitution. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. IV. Pg. 276]

10-2-1874: "conformity to sound doctrine and true principles of republican freedom and constitutional construction, embarrassed the national Democracy . . . assertion of the right to bear arms to overturn an acknowledged usurpation..."

The Memphis Daily Appeal, “the south, by exacting a conformity to sound doctrine and true principles of republican freedom and constitutional construction, embarrassed the national Democracy and led to its defeat . . . assertion of the right to bear arms to overturn an acknowledged usurpation, which is impoverishing and depopulating our country?” . . . “tends to a little more activity in the sale of arms, especially of revolvers, while a Presidential election always accelerates the sale to a considerable extent….”, Oct. 2, 1874

“Our help is in the name of the Lord, who made Heaven and earth. . . . our last right, the right to bear arms, about to be taken from us, then, and not until then, we arose in our might, asserting man’s birthright . . ."

Sermon Delivered in New Orleans, “Our help is in the name of the Lord, who made Heaven and earth. . . . our last right, the right to bear arms, about to be taken from us, then, and not until then, we arose in our might, asserting man’s birthright . . . The first act of our asserted freedom was to give God thanks.”, Sept. 20, 1874

9-27-1874: “and of the sacred right of every American freeman to keep and bear arms . . . in defense of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms”

The New Orleans Bulletin, “and of the sacred right of every American freeman to keep and bear arms . . . in defense of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms”, Sept. 27, 1874

The people that seek [constitutionally repugnant] 'gun control' . . .

   Do so out of fear, ignorance, and guilt.

   Those that do so out of fear, do so because they themselves are cowardly and want others to "protect" them. And are both ashamed and discomforted by those that are confident and secure.

   They that are ignorant, do so because they have no idea what true freedom and liberty really mean. They have swallowed and believe the lie that government is there to provide for their security. What they don't realize, is that our governments were only instituted for the "common defense". And that it is not only the right, but the duty of the citizen to provide for their own defense - against all enemies, whether foreign or domestic.

   The ones that are motivated by guilt are the most dangerous. For they know that an armed people are confident and safe. And that if We The People ever really discover all of the crimes that they have committed while [supposedly] "serving" us. That we may very well rise up one day and make them pay for their crimes. They have planned, as well as even hoped, for that event however. For that would provide them the justification they need to finally crush out all remaining freedom and liberty here in America. But fortunately, many of their "enforcers" have awakened to their diabolical schemes. And many of them would join We The People in finally crushing the tyrants, instead of them crushing us.

   We are basically in a stalemate at present. And the side which utilizes the truth, and spreads it far and wide enough to defeat the lies. Is the side that will most likely achieve victory.

"An occasional recourse to the revolver or rifle has never been so uncommon in this country as to excite great attention, except when its occurrence could be tortured to suit a partisan purpose. . . ."

New York Sunday Herald, “The Right of Revolution. . . . An occasional recourse to the revolver or rifle has never been so uncommon in this country as to excite great attention, except when its occurrence could be tortured to suit a partisan purpose. . . . Deprived of the right to bear arms, they were no longer freemen.”, Sept. 26, 1874

8-22-1787: "add, 'the judges of the Supreme Court shall be triable by the Senate, on impeachment by the House of Representatives.'"

   "Mr. RUTLEDGE, from the committee to whom were referred, on the 18th and 20th instant, the propositions of Mr. Madison and Mr. Pinckney, made the report following:-- . . .

. . . . "At the end of the second section of the eleventh article, add, 'the judges of the Supreme Court shall be triable by the Senate, on impeachment by the House of Representatives.'"--Aug. 22, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 461]

James Madison, "If the legislature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution. . . . It was as improper as to allow them to fix their own wages, or their own privileges...."

   "Mr. MADISON was opposed to the section, as vesting an improper and dangerous power in the legislature. The qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental articles in a republican government, and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the legislature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution. A republic may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy, as well by limiting the number capable of being elected as the number authorized to elect. In all cases where the representatives of the people will have a personal interest distinct from that of their constituents, there was the same reason for being jealous of them as there was for relying on them with full confidence, when they had a common interest. This was one of the former cases. It was as improper as to allow them to fix their own wages, or their own privileges. It was a power, also, which might he made subservient to the views of one faction against another. Qualifications founded on artificial distinctions may be devised by the stronger in order to keep out partizans of a weaker faction." [Aug. 10, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 404]

Benjamin Franklin, "Some of the greatest rogues he was ever acquainted with were the richest rogues. We should remember the character which the Scripture requires in rulers, that they should be men hating covetousness...."

   "Dr. [Benjamin] FRANKLIN expressed his dislike to every thing that tended to debase the spirit of the common people. If honesty was often the companion of wealth, and if poverty was exposed to peculiar temptation, it was not less true that the possession of property increased the desire of more property. Some of the greatest rogues he was ever acquainted with were the richest rogues. We should remember the character which the Scripture requires in rulers, that they should be men hating covetousness. This Constitution will be much read and attended to in Europe; and, if it should betray a great partiality to the rich, will not only hurt us in the esteem of the most liberal and enlightened men there, but discourage the common people from removing to this country." [Aug. 10, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 403]

   I don't know why I thought of Bloomberg when reading this....

"and damns them to the most cruel bondage . . . in a government instituted for the protection of the rights of mankind

    “The admission of slaves into the representation, when fairly explained, comes to this,–that the inhabitant of Georgia and South Carolina, who goes to the coast of Africa, and, in defiance of the most sacred Laws of humanity, tears away his fellow-creatures from their dearest connections, and damns them to the most cruel bondage, shall have more votes, in a government instituted for the protection of the rights of mankind, than the citizen of Pennsylvania or New Jersey, who views, with a laudable horror, so nefarious a practice. He would add, that domestic slavery is the most prominent feature in the aristocratic countenance of the proposed Constitution. The vassalage of the poor has ever been the favorite offspring of aristocracy. And what is the proposed compensation to the Northern States, for a sacrifice of every principle of right, of every impulse of humanity?”–Mr. Gouverneur Morris, Aug. 8, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 393]

George Mason, "It might also happen, that a rich foreign nation, for example, Great Britain, might send over her tools, who might bribe their way into the legislature for insidious purposes."

   Col. [George] MASON was for opening a wide door for emigrants; but did not choose to let foreigners and adventurers make laws for us and govern us. Citizenship for three years was not enough for ensuring that local knowledge which ought to be possessed by the representative. This was the principal ground of his objection to so short a term. It might also happen, that a rich foreign nation, for example, Great Britain, might send over her tools, who might bribe their way into the legislature for insidious purposes. He moved that "seven" years, instead of" three," be inserted.

[Aug. 8, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 389]

AMEN! "A great vice in our system was that of legislating too much....."

   "Mr. KING could not think there would be a necessity for a meeting every year. A great vice in our system was that of legislating too much. The most numerous objects of legislation belong to the states. Those of the national legislature were but few. The chief of them were commerce and revenue. When these should be once settled, alterations would be rarely necessary and easily made."--Aug. 7, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 383]

"...Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified..."

United States Constitution

Article IV

Section 2

   The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.

Article V

   The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

Article VI

   This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

   The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

Amendment II

"Restrictive Clause"

[See Original preamble to the Bill of Rights as was submitted to the States for ratification.]

"the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

"...Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified..."

   If the framers of Amendment II had intended it as applying only to the "militia", then the amendment would have read:

   "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the militia to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."  

   Hmmmmmmmmm. That seems pretty damn clear to me.

How can one be bound to “support”, yet be permitted to violate?

Constitution Draft, “The members of the legislatures, and the executive and judicial officers of the United States, and of the several states, shall be bound by oath to support this Constitution.”, [How can one be bound to “support”, yet be permitted to violate?] Aug. 6, 1787

Constitution Resolves, 7. . . . "shall be the supreme law of the respective states, as far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said states, or their citizens and inhabitants . . . any thing in the respective laws of the individual states to the contrary notwithstanding.”

Debates In The Federal Convention, Constitution Resolves, “7. Resolved, That the legislative acts of the United States, made by virtue and in pursuance of the Articles of Union . . . shall be the supreme law of the respective states, as far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said states, or their citizens and inhabitants; and that the judiciaries of the several states shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual states to the contrary notwithstanding.”, July 26, 1787

Benjamin Franklin, "This, he thought, was contrary to republican principles. In free governments, the rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors and sovereigns...."

   [George Mason]--"...Having for his primary object--for the polar star of his political conduct--the preservation of the rights of the people, he held it as an essential point, as the very palladium of civil liberty, that the great officers of state, and particularly the executive, should at fixed periods return to that mass from which they were at first taken, in order that they may feel and respect those rights and interests which are again to be personally valuable to them. He concluded with moving, that the constitution of the executive, as reported by the committee of the whole, be reinstated, viz., "that the executive be appointed for seven years, and be ineligible a second time."

   Mr. DAVIE seconded the motion.

   Dr. FRANKLIN. It seems to have been imagined by some, that the returning to the mass of the people was degrading the magistrate. This, he thought, was contrary to republican principles. In free governments, the rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors and sovereigns. For the former, therefore, to return among the latter, was not to degrade, but to promote, them. And it would be imposing an unreasonable burden on them, to keep them always in a state of servitude, and not allow them to become again one of the masters.

[July 26, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 369]

George Mason, "Whither, then, must we resort? To the people, with whom all power remains that has not been given up in the constitutions derived from them."

    “Col. [George] MASON considered a reference of the plan to the authority of the people as one of the most important and essential of the resolutions. The legislatures have no power to ratify it. They are the mere creatures of the state constitutions, and cannot be greater than their creators. And he knew of no power in any of the constitutions–he knew there was no power in some of them–that could be competent to this object. Whither, then, must we resort? To the people, with whom all power remains that has not been given up in the constitutions derived from them. It was of great moment, he observed, that this doctrine should be cherished, as the basis of free government. Another strong reason was, that, admitting the legislatures to have a competent authority, it would be wrong to refer the plan to them, because succeeding legislatures, having equal anthority could undo the acts of their predecessors; and the national government would stand, in each state, on the weak and tottering foundation [Pg. 353] of an act of assembly. There was a remaining consideration, of some weight. In some of the states, the governments were not derived from the clear and undisputed authority of the people. This was the case in Virginia. Some of the best and wisest citizens considered the constitution as established by an assumed authority. A national constitution derived from such a source would be exposed to the severest criticisms.”–July 23, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 352-53]

   I know I didn't give up my right to keep and bear arms. Did you? No, I didn't think so....

James Madison, “the judges who refused to execute an unconstitutional law were displaced; and others substituted, by the legislature, who would be the willing instruments of the wicked and arbitrary plans of their masters...."

The Debates in the Federal Convention, James Madison, “the judges who refused to execute an unconstitutional law were displaced; and others substituted, by the legislature, who would be the willing instruments of the wicked and arbitrary plans of their masters. A power of negativing the improper laws of the states is at once the most mild and certain means of preserving the harmony…”, July 17, 1787

Edmund Randolph: "it was an additional reason for tying their hands in such a manner that they could not sacrifice their trust to momentary considerations."

   "If the danger suggested by Mr. Gouverneur Morris be real, of advantage being taken of the legislature in pressing moments, it was an additional reason for tying their hands in such a manner that they could not sacrifice their trust to momentary considerations."--Edmund Randolph, July 11, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. V,  Pg. 294]

George Mason: “From the nature of man, we may be sure that those who have power in their hands will not give it up, while they can retain it. On the contrary, we know that they will always, when they can, rather increase it.”

    “From the nature of man, we may be sure that those who have power in their hands will not give it up, while they can retain it. On the contrary, we know that they will always, when they can, rather increase it.”–George Mason, July 11, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 294]

"Every man of observation had seen in the democratic branches of the state legislatures, precipitation–in Congress, changeableness–in every department, excesses against personal liberty, private property, and personal safety.”

    “What is this object? [Of the Senate] To check the precipitation, changeableness, and excesses, of the first branch [House of Representatives]. Every man of observation had seen in the democratic branches of the state legislatures, precipitation–in Congress, changeableness–in every department, excesses against personal liberty, private property, and personal safety.”–Gouverneur Morris, July 2, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 270]

James Madison, "Wherever there is danger of attack, there ought to be given a constitutional power of defence.", June 30, 1787

   "He admitted that every peculiar interest, whether in any class of citizens, or any description of states, ought to be secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack, there ought to be given a constitutional power of defence."--James Madison, June 30, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 264]

The Right to Keep and Bear Arms: We The People's insurance policy

   The right to keep and bear arms insures:

   That respect will be maintained between the governors and the governed.

   Between the law-abiding and the lawless.

   Between the worthy and the worthless.

   For a respectful fear provides a most powerful motivation to maintain actions within lawful bounds.

   Just as our governments have the threat of force in order to maintain law and order. We The People have the very same threat of force to insure that our governments maintain themselves.

   Which is the very reason that those that 'govern' use [unconstitutional] 'gun control laws'. So that they can slowly whittle down the numbers of those that would be able to resist them. And is of course always done under the guise of safety, and that it is for our own good. When in reality, the only "safety" they are concerned about is their own...

   The thought of hot lead, is the only thing that maintains fear in the cold heart of the tyrant.

Dr. [William Samuel] JOHNSON: "as well as for the individuals composing them. Does it not seem to follow, that if the states, as such, are to exist, they must be armed with some power of self-defence? This is the idea of Col. Mason..."

   In Convention.--Dr. [William Samuel] JOHNSON.* The controversy must be endless whilst gentlemen differ in the grounds of their arguments: those on one side considering the states as districts of people composing one political society, those on the other considering them as so many political societies. The fact is, that the states do exist as political societies, and a government is to be formed for them in their political capacity, as well as for the individuals composing them. Does it not seem to follow, that if the states, as such, are to exist, they must be armed with some power of self-defence? This is the idea of Col. Mason**, who appears to have looked to the bottom of this matter. Besides the aristocratic and other interests, which ought to have the means of defending themselves, the states have their interests as such, and are equally entitled to like means. On the whole, he thought that as, in some respects, the states are to be considered in their political capacity, and, in others, as districts of individual citizens, the two ideas embraced on different sides, instead of being opposed to each other, ought to be combined-- that in one branch the people ought to be represented, in the other, the states.

[June 29, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 255]

* - Dr. William Samuel Johnson was in the Continental Congress, (1785-87), and was one of the most influential and popular delegates. Playing a major role in the Constitutional Convention, he missed no sessions after arriving on June 2; espoused the Connecticut Compromise; and chaired the Committee of Style, which shaped the final document. He also worked for ratification in Connecticut.

   Johnson took part in the new government, in the U.S. Senate where he contributed to passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789. In 1791, the year after the government moved from New York to Philadelphia, he resigned mainly because he preferred to devote all his energies to the presidency of Columbia College, (1787-1800), in New York City. During these years, he established the school on a firm basis and recruited a fine faculty.

** - Here's another "matter" that Col. George Mason "looked to the bottom of"--

   “XVII. That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state. That standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the community will admit; and that in all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by the civil power.”–A Declaration of Rights made by the Representatives of the People of Virginia, June, 12th, 1776. [Written by George Mason. And parts of which were employed by Thomas Jefferson in drafting the Declaration of Independence.]

Also See:

The Extent of Government Authority and Power Over the Right of We The People of the United States of America to Keep and Bear Arms

Benjamin Franklin, "And have we now forgotten that powerful Friend? Or do we imagine that we no longer need his assistance? . . . that the past omission of a duty could not justify a further omission..."

   Dr. FRANKLIN. Mr. President, the small progress we have made after four or five weeks' close attendance and continual reasonings with each olher--our different sentiments on almost every question, several of the last producing as many noes as ayes--is, methinks, a melancholy proof of the imperfection of the human understanding. We indeed seem to feel our own want of political wisdom since we have been running about in search of it. We have gone back to ancient history for models of government, and examined the different forms of those republics which, having been formed with the seeds of their own dissolution, now no longer exist. And we have viewed modern states all round Europe, but find none of their constitutions suitable to our circumstances.

   In this situation of this assembly, groping, as it were, in the dark, to find political truth, and scarce able to distinguish it when presented to us, how has it happened, sir, that we have not hitherto once thought of humbly applying to the Father of lights to illuminate our understandings ? In the beginning of the contest with Great [Pg. 254] Britain, when we were sensible of danger, we had daily prayer in this room for the divine protection. Our prayers, sir, were heard, and they were graciously answered. All of us who were engaged in the struggle must have observed frequent instances of a superintending Providence in our favor. To that kind Providence we owe this happy opportunity of consulting in peace on the means of establishing our future national felicity. And have we now forgotten that powerful Friend? Or do we imagine that we no longer need his assistance? I have lived, sir, a long time, and, the longer I live, the more convincing proofs I see of this truth--that God governs in the affairs of men. And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his notice, is it probable that an empire can rise without his aid? We have been assured, sir, in the sacred writings, that "except the Lord build the house, they labor in vain that build it." I firmly believe this; and I also believe that without his concurring aid we shall succeed, in this political building, no better than the builders of Babel. We shall be divided by our little partial local interests; our projects will be confounded; and we ourselves shall become a reproach and by-word down to future ages. And, what is worse, mankind may hereafter, from this unfortunate instance, despair of establishing governments by human wisdom, and leave it to chance, war, and conquest.

   I therefore beg leave to move that, henceforth, prayers imploring the assistance of Heaven, and its blessings on our deliberations, be held in this assembly every morning before we proceed to business, and that one or more of the clergy of this city be requested to officiate in that service.

   Mr. SHERMAN seconded the motion.

   Mr. HAMILTON and several others expressed their apprehensions that, however proper such a resolution might have been at the beginning of the Convention, it might at this late day, in the first place, bring on it some disagreeable animadversions; and, in the second, lead the public to believe that the embarrassments and dissensions within the Convention had suggested this measure. It was answered, by Dr. FRANKLIN, Mr. SHERMAN, and others, that the past omission of a duty could not justify a further omission . . .

[June 28, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 253-54]

   Perhaps We The People, particularly those battling for our rights. Would do well to, once again, follow the wise advice of Dr. Franklin. If He worked for our forebears, can we expect any less from Him now if we ask His aid? "Or do we imagine that we no longer need his assistance?"

"The question is, not what rights naturally belong to man, but how they may be most equally and effectually guarded in society."

   "Mr. SHERMAN. The question is, not what rights naturally belong to man, but how they may be most equally and effectually guarded in society. And if some give up more than others, in order to obtain this end, there can be no room for complaint. To do otherwise, to require an equal concession from all, if it would create danger to the rights of some, would be sacrificing the end to the means. The rich man who enters into society along with the poor man gives up more than the poor man, yet, with an equal vote, he is equally safe. Were he to have more votes than the poor man, in proportion to his superior stake, the rights of the poor man would immediately cease to be secure. This consideration prevailed when the Articles of Coufederation were formed."--June 28, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 253]

Wail of the siren and flashing lights . . .

   Yes officer, did I do something wrong?

   Well no, I just pulled you over with some lame excuse in order to see if I can get you on something else. Is that a firearm you are wearing?

   Yes officer, it is.

   I'm going to have to ask you to give it to me sloooooowly.

   Why?

   For my safety, that's why.

   But, wait a minute officer. I've done nothing against the law, and aren't you my hired servant?

   Look pal, I don't need a civics lesson. I'm just following procedure.

   I'm sorry officer, but I don't see how your "procedure" outweighs my right as secured by the "supreme law of the land". And I'm not posing any threat to you at all, nor have I committed any crime. Besides, how does your "safety" as a servant become more important than mine as one of your masters?

   Because that's the way it is!

   I'm sorry officer, but I must disagree. Did you not sware a solemn oath to the effect of the following manner?--

   "I (state your name), do solemnly swear (or affirm), that I will support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution and laws of the State of ____________, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same, and defend them against enemies, foreign and domestic, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge, the duties of a peace officer, to the best of my ability, so help me God."   

   Why yes, I most certainly did.

   And if I'm not mistaken, does not that Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this state, in substance, state the following?--

   "The right of the people to keep and bear shall no be infringed"?

   Yes, it does . . . but our 'procedure' states...

   Let me ask you something, officer. What has more weight; your 'procedure' or the "Supreme Law of the Land"? Whose "safety" is paramount, that of the servant or that of the "master"?

   Well, ah....

   Was not the whole purpose of securing that right in the first place. To keep you from doing that which you are asking me to do right now?

Knock, knock....

Who's there?

It's your conscious.

What?

Your conscious.

But, I don't understand....

That's obvious.

Okay, what do you want?

I'm here to remind you about your rights.

What rights?

The rights that thousands of your forebears bled, cried, fought and died for. The rights that your forebears believed were the gift of God.

Yeah, so?

They left those rights in your care; to defend and uphold them. So that you could pass them on to your children and their children after them. They wanted you to be vigilant againt any attempt by your hired servants to encroach upon them.

Yeah, but isn't that what our hired servants are supposed to do? Besides, I'm busy. I have to work in order to pay my bills and put food on the table! And then I need to unwind by watching my favorite shows, and going to my baseball and football games.

Yeah, the Romans called that "bread and games" [panem et circenses]. Which were intended by the tyrants of that day to destract the freemen from their duty. As Marcus Tullius Cicero had noted:

   "The evil was not in bread & circuses, per se, but in the willingness of people to sell their rights as freemen for full bellies and the excitement of the games which would serve to distract them from the other human hungers which bread and Circuses can never appease."

Yeah, but I work hard. And I need to relax after working all day. Besides, like I said, aren't my hired servants supposed to "secure" those rights for me?

Does it make any sense to you at all, that the ones which are most likely to have an interest in removing your rights are the safest hands to put them in?

Well no, now that you mention it. But still, what can I do about it? I'm only one guy.

It is your duty to awaken yourself out of the slumber you've been in. As well as to awaken your fellow citizens out of their slumber. And as Samuel Adams noted:

   "It does not require a majority to prevail, but rather an irate, tireless minority keen to set brush fires in people's minds."

Okay, I can see that. But still, those hired servants of ours have all of the arms!

Not true, We The People are the most heavily armed people in all of the world. But your duty doesn't necessarily involve the use of those arms. As is noted by Thomas Paine:

   “The supposed quietude of a good man allures the ruffian; while on the other hand, arms, like law, discourage and keep the invader and the plunderer in awe, and preserve order in the world as well as property. The balance of power is the scale of peace. The same balance would be preserved were all the world destitute of arms, for all would be alike; but since some will not, others dare not lay them aside. And while a single nation refuses to lay them down, it is proper that all should keep them up. Horrid mischief would ensue were one-half the world deprived of the use of them; for while avarice and ambition have a place in the heart of man, the weak will become a prey to the strong. The history of every age and nation establishes these truths, and facts need but little arguments when they prove themselves.”–Thomas Paine, “Thoughts on Defensive War” in Pennsylvania Magazine (July 1775); signed “A Lover Of Peace”.

Yeah, that makes sense. But it doesn't seem to be hindering our hired servants from carrying out their designs.

Obviously you still are not paying attention. Look more closely at what Mr. Paine had written; "The supposed quietude of a good man allures the ruffian...". The threat of arms is meaningless unless the tyrants have a valid fear that those arms could be used against them....

Well how do we do that?

The angry concerted scream of millions will open even the dullest of ears....
 Man, I thought "knock, knock" jokes were supposed to be funny!

"Mr. MADISON thought the members of the legislature too much interested, to ascertain their own compensation. It would be indecent to put their hands into the public purse for the sake of their own pockets."

   "Mr. MADISON thought the members of the legislature too much interested, to ascertain their own compensation. It would be indecent to put their hands into the public purse for the sake of their own pockets."--James Madison, June 22, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 227]

About the 'president' . . . .

 U.S. Constitution

Article II

Section 1

    The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice-President chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:

    Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.

    The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not lie an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; a quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two-thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice-President.

    The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.

    No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

    In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

    The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

    Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Section 2

    The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

    He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

    The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

Section 3

    He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

Section 4

    The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

   I'm sorry, but I just can't seem to see the part that says the 'president' can issue dictatorial orders....

The Constitution says: "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." . . .

The Supreme Court [finally, again, after over 120 years] says: 'Yes, the people have a right to keep and bear arms'...BUT...

Yeah, but The Constitution says: "shall not be infringed."

The Supreme Court says: 'We don't care what the Constitution "says". WE say that it CAN be infringed.'

We The People say: But what about our Constitution, and the oaths you have taken to "uphold and defend" it?

The Supreme Court says: Get away from me kid, you're bothering me....[Doors of Justice slamming shut in our faces....]

Alexander Hamilton: "Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both, therefore, ought to have the power, that each may defend itself against the other."

   "Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both, therefore, ought to have the power, that each may defend itself against the other."--Alexander Hamilton, June 18, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 203]

Benjamin Franklin, "disliked the word "liberal." . . . He remarked the tendency of abuses, in every case . . . The word "liberal" was struck out."

   "Dr. [Benjamin] FRANKLIN said, he approved of the amendment just made for rendering the salaries as fixed, as possible but disliked the word "liberal." He would prefer the word "moderate," if it was necessary to substitute any other. He remarked the tendency of abuses, in every case, to grow of themselves when once begun, and related very pleasantly the progression in ecclesiastical benefices, from the first departure from the gratuitous provision for the apostles, to the establishment of the papal system. The word "liberal" was struck out. nem. con."--June 12, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 185]

   I knew there was a reason why I always liked good ol' Ben! [I just couldn't resist....] ;)

James Madison, "In short, whether the object of the revisionary power was to restrain the legislature from encroaching on the other coordinate departments, or on the rights of the people at large..."

[The following quotation from Mr. Madison had directly followed that of Mr. Wilson in the previous post.]

   "Mr. MADISON seconded the motion. He observed, that the great difficulty in rendering the executive competent to its own defence arose from the nature of republican government, which could not give to an individual citizen that settled preeminence in the eyes of the rest, that weight of property, that personal interest against betraying the national interest, which appertain to an hereditary magistrate. In a republic, personal merit alone could be the ground of political exaltation; but it would rarely happen that this merit would be so preeminent as to produce universal acquiescence. The executive magistrate would be envied and assailed by disappointed competitors: his firmness therefore would need support. He would not possess those great emoluments from his station, nor that permanent stake in the public interest, which would place him out of the reach of foreign corruption. He would stand in need, therefore, of being controlled as well as supported. An association of the judges in his revisionary function would both double the advantage and diminish the danger. It would also enable the judiciary department the better to defend itself against legislative encroachments. Two objections had been made: first, that the judges ought not to be subject to the bias which a participation in the making of laws might give in the exposition of them; secondly, that the judiciary department ought to be separate and distinct from the other great departments. The first objection [Pg. 165] had some weight; but it was much diminished by reflecting, that a small proportion of the laws coming in question before a judge would be such wherein he had been consulted; that a small part of this proportion would be so ambiguous as to leave room for his prepossessions; and that but a few cases would probably arise, in the life of a judge, under such ambiguous passages. How much good, on the other hand, would proceed from the perspicuity, the conciseness, and the systematic character, which the code of laws would receive from the judiciary talents. As to the second objection, it either had no weight, or it applied with equal weight to the executive, and to the judiciary, revision of the laws. The maxim on which the objection was founded required a separation of the executive, as well as the judiciary, from the legislature and from each other. There would, in truth, however, be no improper mixture of these distinct powers in the present case. In England, whence the maxim itself had been drawn, the executive had an absolute negative on the laws; and the supreme tribunal of justice (the House of Lords) formed one of the other branches of the legislature. In short, whether the object of the revisionary power was to restrain the legislature from encroaching on the other coordinate departments, or on the rights of the people at large, or from passing laws unwise in their principle or incorrect in their form, the utility of annexing the wisdom and weight of the judiciary to the executive seemed incontestable."--James Madison, June 6, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 164-65]

James Wilson, "He saw no incompatibility between the national and state governments, provided the latter were restrained to certain local purposes..."

   "Mr. WILSON would not have spoken again, but for what had fallen from Mr. Read; namely, that the idea of preserving the state governments ought to be abandoned. He saw no incompatibility between the national and state governments, provided the latter were restrained to certain local purposes; nor any probability of their being devoured by the former. In all confederated systems, ancient and modern, the reverse had happened; the generality being destroyed gradually by the usurpations of the parts composing it."--James Wilson, June 6, 1787, (Mr. Wilson was one of the first U.S. Supreme Court Justices. Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 164]

   Mr. Wilson was also the one that had later written:

    “The defence of one’s self, justly called the primary law of nature, is not, nor can it be abrogated by any regulation of municipal law. This principle of defence is not confined merely to the person; it extends to the liberty and the property of a man: it is not confined merely to his own person; it extends to the persons of all those, to whom he bears a peculiar relation — of his wife, of his parent, of his child, of his master, of his servant: nay, it extends to the person of every one, who is in danger; perhaps, to the liberty of every one, whose liberty is unjustly and forcibly attacked. It becomes humanity as well as justice.”–U.S. Supreme Court Justice James Wilson, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, [Lectures – 1790-1792.] (Mr. Wilson had Signed the Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution. He was a congressman, and a delegate to the Constitutional Convention. Ending up being one of the chief proponents of our present Constitution. In addition he was one of the original U.S. Supreme Court Justices appointed by President George Washington).

James Madison: “the necessity, of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice. Interferences with these were evils which had more perhaps than any thing else, produced this convention.

The Debates in the Federal Convention, James Madison: “He differed from the member from Connecticut (Mr. Sherman) in thinking the objects mentioned to be all the principal ones that required a National Govt. Those were certainly important and necessary objects; but he combined with them the necessity, of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice. Interferences with these were evils which had more perhaps than any thing else, produced this convention. Was it to be supposed that republican liberty could long exist under the abuses of it practiced in the States.”, June 6, 1787

   Thought it prudent to expand the above with a pertinent quote from Elliot's Debates of the same day. Which has some slight variances from that of Farrand's, which the linked quote above was from:

    "Mr. MADISON considered an election of one branch, at least, of the legislalure by the people immediately, as a clear principle of free government; and that this mode, under proper regulations, had the additional advantage of securing better representatives, as well as of avoiding, to great an agency of the state governments in the general one. He differed from the member from Connecticut, (Mr. Sher- [Pg. 162] man,) in thinking the objects mentioned to be all the principal ones that required a national government. Those were certainly important and necessary objects; but he combined with them the necessity of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of justice. Interferences with these were evils which had, more perhaps than any thing else, produced this Convention. Was it to be supposed, that republican liberty could long exist under the abuses of it practised in some of the states? The gentleman (Mr. Sherman) had admitted that, in a very small state, faction and oppression would prevail. It was to be inferred, then, that wherever these prevailed, the state was too small. Had they not prevailed in the largest as well as the smallest, though less than in the smallest? And were we not thence admonished to enlarge the sphere as far as the nature of the government would admit? This was the only defence against the inconveniences of democracy consistent with the democratic form of government."--James Madison, June 6, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Eliiot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 161-62]

George Mason, "Much, he said, had been alleged against democratic elections. . . . But compare these with the advantage of this form, in favor of the rights of the people--in favor of human nature."

   "Col. MASON. Under the existing Confederacy, Congress represent the states, and not the people of the states; their acts operate on the states, not on the individuals. The case will be changed in the new plan of government. The people will be represented: they ought therefore to choose the representatives. The requisites in actual representation are, that the representatives should sympathize with their constituents; should think as they think, and feel as they feel; and that for these purposes they should be residents among them. Much, he said, had been alleged against democratic elections. He admitted that much might be said; but it was to be considered that no government was free from imperfections and evils; and that improper elections, in many instances, were inseparable froth republican governments. But compare these with the advantage of this form, in favor of the rights of the people--in favor of human nature. He was persuaded there was a better chance for proper elections by the people, if divided into large districts, than by the state legislatures. Paper money had been issued by the latter, when the former were against it. Was it to be supposed that the state legislatures, then, would not send to the national legislature patrons of such projects, if the choice depended on them?"--Col. [George Mason, June , 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Eliiot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 161]

PRICELESS . . . . "the worst men get into the legislature. Several members of that body had lately been convicted of infamous crimes. Men of indigence, ignorance, and baseness, spare no pains, however dirty..."

   "Mr. GERRY. Much depends on the mode of election. In England, the people will probably lose their liberty from the smallness of the proportion having a right of suffrage. Our danger arises from the opposite extreme. Hence, in Massachusetts, the worst men get into the legislature. Several members of that body had lately been convicted of infamous crimes. Men of indigence, ignorance, and baseness, spare no pains, however dirty, to carry their point against men who are superior to the artifices practised. He was not disposed to run into extremes. He was as much principled as ever against aristocracy and monarchy. It was necessary, on the one hand, that the people should appoint one branch of the government, in order to inspire them with the necessary confidence; but he wished the election, on the other, to be so modified as to secure more effectually a just preference of merit. His idea was, that the people should nominate certain persons, in certain districts, out of whom the state legislatures should make the appointment."--Elbridge Gerry, June , 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Eliiot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 160]

George Mason, "Notwithstanding the oppression and injustice experienced among us from democracy . . . He never could agree to give up all the rights of the people to a single magistrate."

   "Notwithstanding the oppression and injustice experienced among us from democracy, the genius of the people is in favor of it, and the genius of the people must be consulted. He could not but consider the federal system as in effect dissolved by the appointment of this Convention to devise a better one. And do gentlemen look forward to the dangerous interval between the extinction of an old, and the establishment of a new government, and to the scenes of confusion which may ensue? He hoped that nothing like a monarchy would ever be attempted in this country. A hatred to its oppressions had carried the people through the late revolution. Will it not be enough to enable the executive to suspend offensive laws, till they shall be coolly revised, and the objections to them over-ruled by a greater majority than was required in the first instance? He never could agree to give up all the rights of the people to a single magistrate."--Col. [George] Mason, June 4, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Eliiot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 154]

James Madison, "to fix the extent of the executive authority . . . and to execute such other powers, "not legislative nor judiciary in their nature,""

   "Mr. MADISON though it would be proper, before a choice should be made between a unity and a plurality in the executive, to fix the extent of the executive authority; that as certain powers were in their nature executive, and must be given to that department, whether administered by one or more persons, a definition of their extent would assist the judgment in determining how far they might be safely intrusted to a single officer. He accordingly moved that so much of the clause before the committee as related to the powers of the executive should be struck out, and that after the words " that a national executive ought to be instituted," there be inserted the words following, viz., "with power to carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers, "not legislative nor judiciary in their nature," as may from time to time be delegated by the national legislature." The words "not legislative nor judiciary in their nature," were added to the proposed amendment, in consequence of a suggestion, by Gen. PINCKNEY, that improper powers might otherwise be delegated."--June 1, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Eliiot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 141]

   The clear intent of the framers of our Constitution, was that the 'executive' was not allowed to "legislate" from the White House. He/she has no Constitutionally delegated 'authority' or 'power' to issue binding edicts. That is left to the "legislature", which must enact laws within the proper scope of their delegated authority and power. 

"He observed, that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under which the United States labored; that, in tracing these evils to their origin, every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy..."

   "Mr. RANDOLPH observed, that he had, at the time of offering his propositions, stated his ideas, as far as the nature of general propositions required; that details made no part of the plan, and could not perhaps with propriety have been introduced. If he was to give an opinion as to the number of the second branch, he should say that it ought to be much smaller than that of the first; so small as to be exempt from the passionate proceedings to which numerous assemblies are liable. He observed, that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under which the United States labored; that, in tracing these evils to their origin, every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy; that some check therefore was to be sought for against this tendency of our governments; and that a good Senate seemed most likely to answer the purpose."--Edumd Randolph, May 31, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. (Mr. Randolph was one of the two men that had submitted rough drafts of our Constitution, which led to the one we have now). [Eliiot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 138]

   Well OBVIOUSLY, We The People haven't learned our lesson, HAVE WE? Wake the hell up America, before these treasonous half-wits drive us over the cliff....

Also See:

The stances of the major American Political Party’s 

On ‘Gun Control‘

We The People:

    “He thought, too, that the great fabric to be raised would be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars of the legislatures.”–James Madison, May 31, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Eliiot’s Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 137]

George Mason, "He admitted that we had been too democratic . . . We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the people."

   "Mr. MASON argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the government. It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons. It ought to know and sympathize with every part of the community, and ought therefore to be taken, not only from different parts of the whole republic, but also from different districts of the larger members of it; which had in several instances, particularly in Virginia, different interests and views arising from difference of produce, of habits, &c. &c. He admitted that we had been too democratic, but was afraid we should incautiously, run into the opposite extreme. We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the people. He had often wondered at the indifference of the superior classes of society to this dictate of humanity and policy; considering that, however affluent their circumstances, or elevated their situations, might be, the course of a few years not only might, but certainly would, distribute their posterity throughout the lowest classes of society. Every selfish motive, therefore, every family attachment, ought to recommend such a system of policy as would provide no less carefully for the rights and happiness of the lowest, than of the highest, order of citizens."--Mr. George Mason, May, 31, 1787, Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Eliiot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 136]

5-31-1787: "The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy. The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots...."

   "Mr. GERRY. The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy. The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots. In Massachusetts, it had been fully confirmed by experience, that they are daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions, by the false reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can refute. One principal evil arises from the want of due provision for those employed in the administration of government. It would seem to be a maxim of democracy to starve the public servants. He mentioned the popular clamor in Massachusetts for the reduction of salaries, and the attack made on that of the governor, though secured by the spirit of the constitution itself. He had, he said, been too republican heretofore: he was still, however, republican, but had been taught by experience the danger of the levelling spirit."--Elbridge Gerry, May 31, 1787, (Gerry ultimately rejected and refused to sign the Constitution because it lacked a bill of rights. He was later James Madison's Vice-President.), Debates In The Federal Convention Of 1787, Held At Philadelphia. [Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, Pg. 136]

Also See:

The Intent of The Republic

What do you suppose would happen . . .

   If ten, twenty, or even thirty percent of We The People were to go out in public armed on a given day? That would be anywhere from 30-90 or so million of us. It would break the back of the legal system for one thing. And my guess is, that it would force the usurping tyrants to back down. And, I'd bet the crime rates that day would plummet as well.  Which of course would be very unprofitable for the tyrants.

   The only reason the tyrants have been able to get away with their treason. Is because most of We The People obeyed their unconstitutional dictates. If we all disregarded them en masse, there isn't a damn thing they could do about it. For we have RIGHT on our side. While all they have is wrong on theirs.

   Just a thought...

"This Anglo-Saxon word to keep is generally used in s strict literal sense, and then always imports to preserve..."

    Thought this might be of interest, as I stumbled upon it and it sure caught my eye:

   "This Anglo-Saxon word to keep is generally used in s strict literal sense, and then always imports to preserve, and nothing else or more. It is used in divers metaphorical senses, which, from frequency, have the appearance, at first view, of being literal; but it always imports the idea of preservation or indefinite continuation, requested or commanded, it is never used as synonymous with making any thing." [The remainder of the quotation is of the speech itself, from another source] "Every child of three years old knows, when his mother tells him to keep any thing, that she means he is to take care of it. The very instances stated by the gentleman from Missouri serve to show that to keep does not mean to make, but to preserve or to continue indefinitely."--Senator Benjamin Watkins Leigh, U.S. Senate, Expunging Resolution, [April 4,] 1836 [Elliot's Debates, Vol. IV. Pg. 598-9]

  

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Story: "The general government is one of specific powers, and it can rightfully exercise only the powers expressly granted . . . all others being reserved expressly to the states, or to the people."

   "The general government is one of specific powers, and it can rightfully exercise only the powers expressly granted, and those which may be 'necessary and proper' to carry them into effect; all others being reserved expressly to the states, or to the people."--U.S. Supreme Court Justice Story, On The Tariff. Summary Of The Argument On The South Carolina Exposition. (Which was a quote from Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. II, Pg. 430). [Elliot's Debates, Vol. IV, Pg. 592]

Pres. Andrew Jackson, "How, then, can that state be said to be sovereign and independent whose citizens owe obedience to laws not made by it, and whose magistrates are sworn to disregard those laws when they come in conflict with those passed by another?"

   "The states severally have not retained their entire sovereignty.

   "It has been shown that, in becoming parts of a nation, not members of a league, they surrendered many of their essential parts of sovereignty. The right to make treaties, declare war, levy taxes, exercise exclusive judicial and legislative powers, were all of them functions of sovereign power. The states, then, for all these purposes, were no longer sovereign. The allegiance of their citizens was transferred, in the first instance, to the government of the United States: they became American citizens, and owed obedience to the Constitution of the United States, and to laws made in conformity with the powers it vested in Congress. This last position has not been, and cannot be, denied. How, then, can that state be said to be sovereign and independent whose citizens owe obedience to laws not made by it, and whose magistrates are sworn to disregard those laws when they come in conflict with those passed by another?"–President Andrew Jackson, President Jackson’s Proclamation, Of The 10th of December, 1833, Concerning The ordinance Of South Carolina, On The Subject Of The Tariff [Elliot’s Denbates, Vol. IV., Pg. 590-91]

   Now if we can just get the federal government back operating the way it was intended. Then they would go after the states that are disobeying the "Supreme Law of the Land" and the rights secured by that instrument. But, that will only happen if enough of us stand up and MAKE it happen. It is OUR Constitution after all....

Your imagined, or even real fear, does not justify the infringement of my Constitutionaly secured right

   Either get over your fear, or move some place else. Or better yet, how about learning to exercise your right as well? Stop being a sheep. (But please, don't be like a democrat. Who usually has arms themselves, or body-guards. But shudders to think of anyone else being armed.) Because here in this country, We The People have an inalienable natural right to keep and bear arms for both individual and common defense. And, as proven here on this blog, and on my website. That is an irrefutable FACT.

   So either you learn to live with it, or leave. Because if you try to remove that right, all you are doing is making yourself a "domestic enemy". And you'll be worthy of being treated as such. The time for playing games is OVER.

James Madison, "In the United States, the case is altogether different. The people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty. The legislature, no less than the executive, is under limitations of power."

   "2. The next point which the resolution requires to be proved, is, that the power over the press exercised by the sedition-act, is positively forbidden by one of the amendments to the Constitution.

   "The amendment stands in these words — “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”

   "In the attempts to vindicate the “sedition-act,” it has been contended, 1. That the “freedom of the press” is to be determined by the meaning of these terms in the common law. 2. That the article supposes the power over the press to be in Congress, and prohibits them only from abridging the freedom allowed to it by the common law.

   "Although it will be shown, in examining the second of these positions, that the amendment is a denial to Congress of all power over the press, it may not be useless to make the following observations on the first of them:–

   "It is deemed to be a sound opinion, that the sedition-act, in its definition of some of the crimes created, is an abridgment of the freedom of publication, recognised by principles of the common law in England.

   "The freedom of the press under the common law; is, in the defences of the sedition-act, made to consist in an exemption from all previous restraint on printed publications, by persons authorized to inspect and prohibit them. It appears to the committee, that this idea of the freedom of the press, can never be admitted to be the American idea of it: since a law inflicting penalties on printed publications, would have a similar effect with a law authorizing a previous restraint on them. It would seem a mockery to say, that no law should be passed, preventing publications from being made, but that laws might be passed for punishing them in case they should be made.

   "The essential difference between the British government, and the American constitutions, will place this subject in the clearest light.

   "In the British government, the danger of encroachments on the rights of the people, is understood to be confined to the executive magistrate. The representatives of the people in the legislature, are not only exempt themselves, from distrust, but are considered as sufficient guardians of the rights of their constituents against the danger from the executive. Hence it is a principle, that the parliament is unlimited in its power; or, in their own language, is omnipotent. Hence, too, all the ramparts for protecting the rights of the people, such as their magna charta, their bill of rights, &c., are not reared against the parliament, but against the royal prerogative. They are merely legislative precautions against executive usurpations. Under such a government as this, an exemption of the press from previous restraint by licensers appointed by the king, is all the freedom that can be secured to it.

   "In the United States, the case is altogether different. The people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty. The legislature, no less than the executive, is under limitations of power. Encroachments are regarded as possible from the one, as well as from the other. Hence, in the United States, the great and essential rights of the people are secured against legislative, as well as against executive ambition. They are secured, not by laws paramount to prerogative, but by constitutions paramount to laws. This security of the freedom of the press requires, that it should be exempt, not only from previous restraint by the executive, as in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also; and this exemption, to be effectual, must be an exemption not only from the previous inspection of licensers, but from the subsequent penalty of laws."

   "The state of the press, therefore, under the common law, cannot, in this point of view, be the standard of its freedom in the United States."

- James Madison, Madison’s Report On The Virginia Resolutions, House of Delegates, Session 1799-1800. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. IV, Pgs. 569-70]

   And no one can say that the right to keep and bear arms isn't a "great and essential" one. 

   So there you have it folks! Absolute proof that We The People are being deceived and scammed by our hired servants.

James Madison, "If it be, it may be exercised by Congress. If it be not. Congress cannot exercise it."

   "The argument, then, drawn from the common law, on the ground of its being adopted or recognised by the Constitution, being inapplicable to the sedition-act, the committee will proceed to examine the other arguments which have been founded on the Constitution.

   "They will waste but little time on the attempt to cover the act by the preamble to the Constitution; it being contrary to every acknowledged rule of construction, to set up this part of an instrument, in opposition to the plain meaning expressed in the body of the instrument. A preamble usually contains the general motives or reasons, for the particular regulations or measures which follow it; and is always understood to be explained and limited by them. In the present instance, a contrary interpretation would have the inadmissible effect, of rendering nugatory or improper every part of the Constitution which succeeds the preamble.

   "The paragraph in Art. I. sect. 8, which contains the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excise; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare, having been already examined, will also require no particular attention in this place. It will have been seen that in its fair and consistent meaning, it cannot enlarge the enumerated powers vested in Congress.

   "The part of the Constitution which seems most to be recurred to, in defence of the “sedition-act,” is the last clause of the above section, empowering Congress “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United Slates, or in any department or officer thereof.”

   "The plain import of this clause is, that Congress shall have all the incidental or instrumental powers necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the express powers; whether they be vested in the government of the United States, more collectively, or in the several departments or officers thereof. It is not a grant of new powers to Congress, but merely a declaration, for the removal of all uncertainty, that the means of carrying into execution, those otherwise granted, are included in the grant.

   "Whenever, therefore, a question arises concerning the constitutionality of a particular power, the first question is, whether the power be expressed in the Constitution. If it be, the question is decided. If it be not expressed, the next inquiry must be, whether it is properly an incident to an express power, and necessary to its execution. If it be, it may be exercised by Congress. If it be not. Congress cannot exercise it."-–James Madison, Madison’s Report On The Virginia Resolutions, House of Delegates, Session 1799-1800. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. IV, Pg. 567-68]

James Madison, "and a law that would sap the foundation of the Constitution as a system of limited and specified powers. A severer reproach could not, in the opinion of the committee, be thrown on the Constitution, on those who framed, or on those who established it"

   "From the review thus taken of the situation of the American colonies prior to their independence; of the effect of this event on their situation; of the nature and import of the Articles of Confederation; of the true meaning of the passage in the existing Constitution from which the common law has been deduced; of the difficulties and uncertainties incident to the doctrine; and of its vast consequences in extending the powers of the federal government, and in superseding the authorities of the state governments; the committee feel the utmost confidence in concluding, that the common law never was, nor, by any fair construction, ever can be, deemed a law for the American people as one community; and they indulge the strongest expectation that the same conclusion will finally be drawn, by all candid and accurate inquirers into the subject. It is indeed distressing to reflect, that it ever should have been made a question, whether the Constitution, on the whole face of which is seen so much labour to enumerate and define the several objects of federal power, could intend to introduce in the lump, in an indirect manner, and by a forced construction of a few phrases, the vast and multifarious jurisdiction involved in the common law; a law filling so many ample volumes; a law overspreading the entire field of legislation; and a law that would sap the foundation of the Constitution as a system of limited and specified powers. A severer reproach could not, in the opinion of the committee, be thrown on the Constitution, on those who framed, or on those who established it, than such a supposition would throw on them."--James Madison, Madison’s Report On The Virginia Resolutions, House of Delegates, Session 1799-1800. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. IV, Pg. 566-67]

    Does anyone else see that this is precisely what the traitors have employed to destroy our rights?

Mr. Madison further exposes the fallacy of the establishment on the 'common law'...

   " It is further to be considered, that even if this part of the Constitution could be strained into an application to every common law case, criminal as well as civil, it could have no effect in justifying the Sedition Act, which is an exercise of legislative, and not of judicial power: and it is the [Pg. 565] judicial power only, of which the extent is defined in this part of the Constitution.

   "There are two passages in the Constitution, in which a description of the law of the United States is found. The first is contained in Art. III. sect. 2, in the words following: “This Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority.” The second is contained in the second paragraph of Art. VI. as follows: “This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.” The first of these descriptions was meant as a guide to the judges of the United States; the second, as a guide to the judges in the several states. Both of them consists of an enumeration, which was evidently meant to be precise and complete. If the common law had been understood to be a law of the United States, it is not possible to assign a satisfactory reason why it was not expressed in the enumeration.

   "In aid of these objections, the difficulties and confusion inseparable from a constructive introduction of the common law, would afford powerful reasons against it.

   "Is it to be the common law with or without the British statutes?

   "If without the statutory amendments, the vices of the code would be insupportable.

   "If with these amendments, what period is to be fixed for limiting the British authority over our laws?

   "Is it to be the date of the eldest or the youngest of the colonies?

   "Or are the dates to be thrown together, and a medium deduced?

   "Or is our independence to be taken for the date?

   "Is, again, regard to be had to the various changes in the common law made by the local codes of America?

   "Is regard to be had to such changes, subsequent, as well as prior, to the establishment of the Constitution?

   "Is regard to be had to future, as well as past changes?

   "Is the law to be different in every state, as differently modified by its code; or are the modifications of any particular state to be applied to all?

   "And on the latter supposition, which among the state codes would form the standard?

   "Questions of this sort might be multiplied with as much ease, as there would be difficulty in answering them.

   "The consequences flowing from the proposed construction, furnish other objections equally conclusive; unless the text were peremptory in its meaning, and consistent with other parts of the instrument.

   "These consequences may be in relation to the legislative authority of the United States; to the executive authority; to the judicial authority; and to the governments of the several states.

   " If it be understood, that the common law is established by the Constitution, it follows that no part of the law can be altered by the legislature; such of the statutes already passed, as may be repugnant thereto would be nullified; particularly the “sedition-act” itself, which boasts of being a melioration of the common law; and the whole code, with all its incongruities, barbarisms, and bloody maxims, would be inviolably saddled on the good people of the United States.

   "Should this consequence be rejected, and the common law be held, like [Pg. 566] other laws, liable to revision and alteration, by the authority of Congress, it then follows, that the authority of Congress is co-extensive with the objects of common law; that is to say, with every object of legislation: for to every such object does some branch or other of the common law extend. The authority of Congress would, therefore, be no longer under the limitations marked out in the Constitution. They would be authorized to legislate in all cases whatsoever.

   "In the next place, as the President possesses the executive powers of the Constitution, and is to see that the laws be faithfully executed, his authority also must be coextensive with every branch of the common law. The additions which this would make to his power, though not readily to be estimated, claim the most serious attention.

   " This is not all: it will merit the most profound consideration, how far an indefinite admission of the common law, with a latitude in construing it, equal to the construction by which it is deduced from the Constitution, might draw after it the various prerogatives making part of the unwritten law of England. The English constitution itself is nothing more than a composition of unwritten laws and maxims.

   "In the third place, whether the common law be admitted as of legal or of constitutional obligation, it would confer on the judicial department a discretion little short of a legislative power.

   "On the supposition of its having a constitutional obligation, this power in the judges would be permanent and irremediable by the legislature. On the other supposition, the power would not expire, until the legislature should have introduced a full system of statutory provisions. Let it be observed, too, that besides all the uncertainties above enumerated, and which present an immense field for judicial discretion, it would remain with the same department to decide what parts of the common law would, and what would not, be properly applicable to the circumstances of the United States.

   "A discretion of this sort has always been lamented as incongruous and dangerous, even in the colonial and state courts; although so much narrowed by positive provisions in the local codes on all the principal subjects embraced by the common law. Under the United States, where so few laws exist on those subjects, and where so great a lapse of time must happen before the vast chasm could be supplied, it is manifest that the power of the judges over the law would, in fact, erect them into legislators; and that, for a long time, it would be impossible for the citizens to conjecture, either what was, or would be law.

   "In the last place, the consequence of admitting the common law as the law of the United States, on the authority of the individual states, is as obvious as it would be fatal. As this law relates to every subject of legislation, and would be paramount to the constitutions and laws of the states, the admission of it would overwhelm the residuary sovereignty of the states, and by one constructive operation, new-model the whole political fabric of the country."–James Madison, Madison’s Report On The Virginia Resolutions, House of Delegates, Session 1799-1800. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. IV, Pg. 564-66]

"It has become an axiom in the science of government, that a separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments, is necessary to the preservation of public liberty."

   "The alien-act declares, “that it shall be lawful for the President to order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable ground to suspect, are concerned in any treasonable, or secret machinations, against the government thereof, to depart,” &c.

   "Could a power be well given in terms less definite, less particular, and less precise? To be dangerous to the public safety; to be suspected of secret machinations against the government: these can never be mistaken for legal rules or certain definitions. They leave everything to the President. His will is the law.

   "But, it is not a legislative power only, that is given to the President. He is to stand in the place of the judiciary also. His suspicion is the only evidence which is to convict: his order, the only judgment which is to be executed.

   "Thus, it is the President whose will is to designate the offensive conduct; it is his will that is to ascertain the individuals on whom it is charged; and it is his will, that is to cause the sentence to be executed. It is rightly affirmed, therefore, that the act unites legislative and judicial powers to those of the executive.

   "3. It is affirmed, that this union of power subverts the general principles of free government.

   "It has become an axiom in the science of government, that a separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments, is necessary to the preservation of public liberty. Nowhere has this axiom been better understood in theory, or more carefully pursued in practice, than in the United States."–James Madison, Madison’s Report On The Virginia Resolutions, House of Delegates, Session 1799-1800. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. IV, Pg. 560]

   The reasoning of Mr. Madison shown above, would also seem rightfully to apply to presidential edicts. Ah, I mean orders.

James Madison, "On any other hypothesis, the delegation of judicial power would annul the authority delegating it; and the concurrence of this department with the others in usurped powers, might subvert for ever, and beyond the possible reach of any rightful remedy, the very Constitution which all were instituted to preserve."

   "However true, therefore, it may be, that the judicial department, is, in all questions submitted to it by the forms of the Constitution, to decide in the last resort, this resort must necessarily be deemed the last in relation to the authorities of the other departments of the government; not in relation to the rights of the parties to the constitutional compact, from which the judicial as well as the other departments hold their delegated trusts. On any other hypothesis, the delegation of judicial power would annul the authority delegating it; and the concurrence of this department with the others in usurped powers, might subvert for ever, and beyond the possible reach of any rightful remedy, the very Constitution which all were instituted to preserve."–James Madison, Madison’s Report On The Virginia Resolutions, House of Delegates, Session 1799-1800. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. IV, Pg. 549-50]

   And is that not EXACTLY what has happened? We The People have been betrayed....

James Madison: "To these observations, one fact will be added, which demonstrates that the common law cannot be admitted as the universal expositor of American terms, which may be the same with those contained in that law."

   The perverse misapplication and usage of the “common law” and ‘statute law’ by the courts, in cases involving rights secured by the Constitution. Is not only despicably in error, but repugnant. For where rights secured by the “supreme law” are concerned, all decisions must be based upon the law which is fundamental and paramount. Which is of course the Constitution, and NOT the “common law“, which is subject to legislative alterations at any time. Mr. Madison takes the courts, as well as the legislative and executive departments to school below.

   As one of the main authors and promoters of the Constitution, wouldn't it be logical to assume that Mr. Madison knew of that which he wrote? And, that his views would have far more depth and weight than the radically opposing views expressed by the courts, legislatures, or executives? Anyone that could argue against that proposition is obviously seriously mentally handicapped, and/or an usurping tyrant.

   The following excerpt covers just a small part of Mr. Madison's brilliant argument against all possible misapplications of Constitutional  [mis]constructions. Such as those being presently used by the usurping tyrants in [supposed] 'power' in order to destroy our rights. The actual FACTS are quite ably pointed out by Mr. James Madison here:

   “To these observations, one fact will be added, which demonstrates that the common law cannot be admitted as the universal expositor of American terms, which may be the same with those contained in that law. The freedom of conscience, and of religion, are found in the same instruments which assert the freedom of the press. It will never be admitted, that the meaning of the former, in the common law of England, is to limit their meaning in the United States.

   “Whatever weight may be allowed to these considerations, the committee do not, however, by any means intend to rest the question on them. They contend that the article of amendment, instead of supposing in Congress a power that might be exercised over the press, provided its freedom was not abridged, was meant as a positive denial to Congress, of any power whatever on the subject.

   “To demonstrate that this was the true object of the article, it will be sufficient to recall the circumstances which led to it, and to refer to the explanation accompanying the article.

   “When the Constitution was under the discussions which preceded its ratification, it is well known, that great apprehensions were expressed by many, lest the omission of some positive exception from the powers delegated, of certain rights, and of the freedom of the press particularly, might expose them to danger of being drawn by construction within some of the powers vested in Congress; more especially of the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into execution. In reply to this objection, it was invariably urged to be a fundamental and characteristic principle of the Constitution, that all powers not given by it, were reserved; that no powers were given beyond those enumerated in the Constitution, and such as were fairly incident to them; that the power over the rights in question, and particularly over the press, was neither among the enumerated powers, nor incident to any of them; and consequently that an exercise of any such power, would be a manifest usurpation. It is painful to remark, how much the arguments now employed in behalf of the sedition-act, are at variance with the reasoning which then justified the Constitution, and invited its ratification.

   “From this posture of the subject, resulted the interesting question in so many of the conventions, whether the doubts and dangers ascribed to the Constitution, should be removed by any amendments previous to the ratification, or be postponed, in confidence that as far as they might be proper, they would be introduced in the form provided by the Constitution. The latter course was adopted; and in most of the states, the ratifications were followed by propositions and instructions for rendering the Constitution more explicit, and more safe to the rights not meant to be delegated by it. Among those rights, the freedom of the press, in most instances, is particularly and emphatically mentioned. The firm and very pointed manner, in which it is asserted in the proceedings of the convention of this state, will be hereafter seen.

   “In pursuance of the wishes thus expressed, the first Congress that assembled under the Constitution, proposed certain amendments which have since, by the necessary ratifications, been made a part of it; among which amendments, is the article containing, among other prohibitions on the Congress, an express declaration that they should make no law abridging the freedom of the press.

   “Without tracing farther the evidence on this subject, it would seem scarcely possible to doubt, that no power whatever over the press was supposed to be delegated by the Constitution, as it originally stood; and that the amendment was intended as a positive and absolute reservation of it.

   “But the evidence is still stronger. The proposition of amendment is made by Congress, is introduced in the following terms: “The conventions of a number of the states having at the time of their adopting the Constitution expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstructions or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added; and as extending the ground of public confidence in the government, will best ensure the beneficent ends of its institutions.”

   “Here is the most satisfactory and authentic proof, that the several amendments proposed, were to be considered as either declaratory or restrictive; and whether the one or the other, as corresponding with the desire expressed by a number of the states, and as extending the ground of public confidence in the government.

   “Under any other construction of the amendment relating to the press, than that it declared the press to be wholly exempt from the power of Congress, the amendment could neither be said to correspond with the desire expressed by a number of the states, nor be calculated to extend the ground of public confidence in the government.

   “Nay more; the construction employed to justify the “sedition-act,” would exhibit a phenomenon, without a parallel in the political world. It would exhibit a number of respectable states, as denying first that any power over the press was delegated by the Constitution; as proposing next, that an amendment to it, should explicitly declare that no such power was delegated; and finally, as concurring in an amendment actually recognising or delegating such a power.

“Is then the federal government, it will be asked, destitute of every authority for restraining the licentiousness of the press, and for shielding itself against the libellous attacks which may be made on those who administer it?

   “The Constitution alone can answer this question. If no such power be expressly delegated, and it be not both necessary and proper to carry into execution an express power; above all, if it be expressly forbidden by a declaratory amendment to the Constitution, the answer must be, that the federal government is destitute of all such authority.

   “And might it not be asked in turn, whether it is not more probable, under all the circumstances which have been reviewed, that the authority should be withheld by the Constitution, than that it should be left to a vague and violent construction; whilst so much pains were bestowed in enumerating other powers, and so many less important powers are included in the enumeration?

   “Might it not be likewise asked, whether the anxious circumspection which dictated so many peculiar limitations on the general authority, would be unlikely to exempt the press altogether from that authority? The peculiar magnitude of some of the powers necessarily committed to the federal government; the peculiar duration required for the functions of some of its departments; the peculiar distance of the seat of its proceedings from the great body of its constituents; and the peculiar difficulty of circulating an adequate knowledge of them through any other channel; will not these considerations, some or other of which produced other exceptions from the powers of ordinary governments, all together, account for the policy of binding the hand of the federal government, from touching the channel which alone can give efficacy to its responsibility to its constituents; and of leaving those who administer it, to a remedy for their their injured reputations, under the same laws, and in the same tribunals, which protect their lives, their liberties, and their properties?

   “But the question does not turn either on the wisdom of the Constitution, or on the policy which gave rise to its particular organization. It turns on the actual meaning of the instrument; by which it has appeared, that a power over the press is clearly excluded, from the number of powers delegated to the federal government.”–James Madison, Madison’s Report On The Virginia Resolutions, House of Delegates, Session 1799-1800. [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. IV, Pgs. 571-73]

    The whole article, linked to above, is well worth the read. For it is REALITY, and not supposition as is displayed by our hired servants in our governments.

   The “common” or statute law can by no means be enacted or utilized in justification of prior restraints on Constitutionally secured rights. For that would defeat the whole purpose of the people having secured those rights in the “supreme law” to begin with. The ‘ordinary’ law cannot be employed in order to overcome that which is the “Supreme Law”. For that would turn the Constitution into a dead letter. The “common” or statute law can only be employed in determining punishments for the criminal abuse or misuse of a constitutionally secured right – NOT to restrain or destroy it.

   That the American legislatures, courts and executives, which have for so long employed this repugnant method. And having been permitted to get away with it, is stupefying. And if it could be proven to have been done in collusion, with prior knowledge. It could very well be construed as conspiracy to commit treason against We The People – the true “sovereign” authority here in the United States of America.

   Whatever the reason, or excuse that might be offered in justification for this flagrant disregard of the “Supreme Law of the Land”. The FACT is, that it must not only cease and desist in its operation. But, it must be undone, and the Constitution restored to its original splendor.

Also See:

The Extent of Government Authority and Power

   Which has yet again been extended.