"and with which neither States nor Congress were allowed to interfere"

"Note.--Is it not remarkable that Courts will undertake to decide that a deliberately enacted by the Legislature of a sovereign State is unconstitutional and void, because it is in derogation of that clause in the Constitution of the United States which forbids a State to pass a "law impairing the obligation of contracts," when no Court of final jurisdiction has yet determined what is meant by the obligation of contracts? Mark the expression: it is, the "obligation" (in the singular) of "contracts" (in the plural.) Now what does that mean? Certainly something that is the same in all of the States. Whatever it may be, it must be the same in Maine, in South Carolina, in Texas. It is not, and cannot be, something that is doubtful; and, if this case is to be decided by authority, I call for the decision that decides what is the meaning of the phrase. It cannot be the moral obligation, because that existed before the Constitution was adopted, and was obligatory on the parties without its aid. It cannot be the legal obligation because that was an existing right at the framing of the Constitution, which the Courts could then enforce, and if that was the meaning, it would have been so expressed. What then was it? Congress, by the first article of the amendments, declared that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or of the right to petition the government, or of the right of the people to keep and bear arms. What rights were these? They were not rights conferred by law, but they were natural rights which existed independently of law, and with which neither States nor Congress were allowed to interfere. The freedom of speech does not mean slander; the freedom of the press does not mean libel; the right to petition does not mean the impertinent interference of the people of one State with the domestic regulations of the people of another State; the right to bear arms does not mean the right to shoot any man who may offend you. Hence, I infer, that the obligation referred to in the clause under consideration is that natural obligation of contracts which existed before the Constitution was adopted and with which the States were forbidden to interfere. That is, that real obligation, the exact meaning of the contract, which the Courts are to determine whenever the parties thereto disagree, and which no State can impair by legislation. It is the something which is the same in each and every of the States. It cannot be the right to sue, because the practice of the Courts is different in different States, and that was a right which each citizen possessed without the aid of the Constitution, and before it was adopted. It must then be "that natural obligation, which contracts have of natural right in conformity to natural justice." Thus, when A and B enter into a contract which has a plain and natural meaning, the Legislature will not be permitted to place upon the words used to express the contract an artificial meaning, and, if they do, the Courts must declare that every such strained and artificial meaning is unconstitutional and void. How a law, which acts simply upon the remedy, can be forced to come within the meaning of this clause, is what I cannot see.

   Let us take the case of Ogden vs. Saunders, which is the leading case, and on the authority of which all the cases cited have gone; did that case decide what is t"he obligation of contracts?" It did not. Of the seven Judges composing the Court, there were four different opinions, and of the four Judges who did agree in deciding the case, three different opinions prevailed; and so as to the text writers, the same division of opinion obtains. I therefore repeat, it is remarkable that a Court will undertake to decide that the law is unconstitutional, when it has not yet been decided what is "the obligation of contracts."
   Since writing this opinion, Lysander Spooner, Esq., of Boston, kindly sent me his book, entitled "A New System of Paper Currency," and to it I am indebted for the point made in this note.--A.P.A."

[REPORTS OF CASES AT LAW AND IN EQUITY, ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AND COURT OF ERRORS, OF SOUTH CAROLINA. LAW VOL. XIII.-- EQUITY VOL. XII. FROM MAY, 1860, TO MAY, 1866; BOTH INCLUSIVE BY J.S.G. RICHARDSON. CHARLESTON, S.C.: E.J. DAWSON & CO. 1866.]