Tuesday, May 07, 2013

I do believe that Mr. Webster is on to something here...

   "Can any man deny that the plaintiffs had rights, under the charter, which were legally vested, and that by these acts those rights are impaired? "It is a principle in the English law," says chief justice Kent, in the case last cited, "as ancient as the law itself, that a statute, even of its omnipotent parliament, is not to have a retrospective effect. Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis [a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past ]. The maxim in Bracton, was probably taken from the civil law, for we find in that system the same principle, that the lawgiver cannot alter his mind to the prejudice of a vested right. Nemo potest mutare concilium suum in alterius injuriam [No one can change his purpose to the injury of another.]. This maxim of Papinian is general in its terms but Dr. Taylor applies it directly as a restriction upon the lawgiver, and a declaration in the code leaves no doubt as to the sense of the civil law. Leges et constitutiones futuris certum est dare formam negotiis, non ad facta praeterita revocari, nisi nominatim, et de praeterito tempore, et adhuc pendentibus negotiis cautum sit [Laws should be construed as prospective, not retrospective, unless they are expressly made applicable to past transactions and to such as are still pending.]. This passage, according to the best interpretation of the civilians, relates not merely to future suits, but to future, as contradistinguished from past contracts and vested rights. It is, indeed, admitted that the prince may enact a retrospective law, provided it be done expressly; for the will of the prince under the despotism of the Roman Emperors was paramount to every obligation. Great latitude was anciently allowed to legislative expositions of statutes; for the separation of the judicial from the legislative power was not then distinctly known or prescribed. The prince was in the habit of interpreting his own laws for particular occasions. This was called the Interlocutio Principis; and this, according to Huber's definition, was, quando principes inter partes loquuntur it jus dicunt [When the Emperors pronounce between the (litigating) parties, and declare the law (of the case).]. No correct civilian, and especially no proud admirer of the ancient republic, (if any such then existed) could have reflected on this interference with private rights and pending suits without disgust and indignation; and we are rather surprised to find that under the violent and irregular genius of the Roman government, the principle before us should have been acknowledged and obeyed to the extent in which we find it. The fact shows that it must be founded in the clearest justice. Our case is happily very different from that of the subjects of Justinian. With us, the power of the lawgiver is limited and defined; the judicial is regarded as a distinct, independent power: private rights have been better understood and more exalted in public estimation, as well as secured by provisions dictated by the spirit of freedom, and unknown to the civil law. Our constitutions do not admit the power assumed by the Roman prince, and the principle we are considering is now to be regarded as sacred."

   "These acts infringe also the thirty-seventh article of the constitution of New Hampshire; which says that the powers of government shall be kept separate. By these acts, the legislature assumes to exercise a judicial power. It declares a forfeiture, and resumes franchises, once granted, without trial or hearing.

   "If the constitution be not altogether waste paper, it has restrained the power of the legislature, in these particulars. If it has any meaning, it is, that the legislature shall pass no act directly and manifestly impairing private property and private privileges. It shall not judge, by act. It shall not decide, by act. It shall not deprive, by act. But it shall leave all these things to be tried and adjudged, by the law of the land.

   "The fifteenth article has been referred to before. It declares that no one shall be "deprived of his property, immunities or privileges, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land." Notwithstanding the light in which the learned judges in New Hampshire viewed the rights of the plaintiffs under the charter, and which has been before adverted to, it is found to be admitted in their opinion, that those rights are privileges within the meaning of this fifteenth article of the bill of rights. Having quoted that article. they say: "that the right to manage the affairs of this college, is a privilege within the meaning of this clause of the bill of rights, is not to be doubted." In my humble opinion this surrenders the point. To resist the effect of this admission, however, the learned judges add--"But how a privilege can be protected from the operation of the law of the land by a clause in the constitution, declaring that it shall not be taken away, but by the law of the land, is not very easily understood."--This answer goes on the ground, that the acts in question are laws of the land, within the meaning of the constitution. If they be so, the argument drawn from this article is fully answered. If they be not so, it being admitted that the plaintiffs' rights are "privileges," within the meaning of the article, the argument is not answered, and the article is infringed by the acts. Are then these acts of the legislature, which affect only particular persons and their particular privileges, laws of the land? Let this question be answered by the text of Blackstone. "And first it (i.e. law) is a rule: not a transient sudden order from a superior to or concerning a particular person; but something permanent, uniform, and universal. Therefore a particular act of the legislature to confiscate the goods of Titius, or to attaint him of high treason, does not enter into the idea of a municipal law; for the operation of this act is spent upon Titius only, and has no relation to the community in general; it is rather a sentence than a law." Lord Coke is equally decisive and emphatic. Citing and commenting on the celebrated 29th chap. of Magna Charta, he says, "no man shall be disseized, &c. unless it be by the lawful judgment, that is, verdict of equals, or by the law of the land, that is, ( to speak it once for all,) by the due course and process of law. Have the plaintiffs lost their franchises by "due course and process of law?" On the contrary, are not these acts, "particular acts of the legislature, which have no relation to the community in general, and which are rather sentences than laws?"

   "By the law of the land, is most clearly intended, the general law; a law, which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society. Everything which may pass under the form of an enactment, is not therefore to be considered the law of the land. If this were so, acts of attainder, bills of pains and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts directly transferring one man's estate to another, legislative judgments, decrees, and forfeitures in all possible forms, would be the law of the land.

   "Such a strange construction would render constitutional provisions of the highest importance completely inoperative and void. It would tend directly to establish the union of all powers in the legislature. There would be no general permanent law for courts to administer, or for men to live under. The administration of justice would be an empty form, an idle ceremony. Judges would sit to execute legislative judgments and decrees; not to declare the law or to administer the justice of the country. "Is that the law of the land," said Mr. Burke, "upon which, if a man go to Westminster Hall, and ask counsel by what title or tenure he holds his privilege or estate according to the law of the land, he should be told, that the law of the land is not yet known; that no decision or decree has been made in his case; that when a decree shall be passed, he will then know what the law of the land is? Will this be said to be the law of the land, by any lawyer who has a rag of a gown left upon his back, or a wig with one tie upon his head?"

- Daniel Webster, IN THE CASE, THE TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE vs. WILLIAM H. WOODWARD, BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE 10th DAY OF MARCH, 1818. [SPEECHES AND FORENSIC ARGUMENTS. BY DANIEL WEBSTER VOL. I. BOSTON: PERKINS, MARVIN, AND COMPANY. PHILADELPHIA: HENRY PERKINS. 1835.] (Daniel Webster, (January 18, 1782 – October 24, 1852), served in the U.S. House of Representatives (New Hampshire) for 10 years, and in the U.S. Senate, (Massachusetts), for 19 years. Mr. Webster was appointed the Secretary of State under three presidents. He also took part in several key U.S. Supreme Court cases which established important constitutional precedents).

And of course our Supreme Law of the Land states:

"The Right of the People shall NOT be infringed".

Now, if our hired servants in government have been expressly denied the authority to enact any legislation contravening that right. (Which according to the 2nd Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, they most certainly have). Then the 'laws' enacted by them have no valid Constitutional authority, CORRECT? They have abused their authority, and have tread upon ground they were NOT permitted  to.

To further illustrate the point. Let us examine the meaning of the word "infringed" from origin, shall we?:


    TO INFRINGE, V. To encroach.


    INFRINGE, from frango to break, signifies to break into.

    VIOLATE, from the Latin vis force, signifies to use force towards.

    TRANSGRESS, from trans and gredior, signifies to go beyond, or farther than we ought.

    The civil and moral laws are infringed by those who act in opposition to them: treaties and engagements are violated by those who do not hold them sacred: the bounds which are prescribed by the moral law are transgressed by those who are guilty of any excess. It is the business of government to see that the rights and privileges of individuals or particular bodies be not infringed: policy but too frequently runs counter to equity; where the particular interests of princes are more regarded than the dictates of conscience; treaties and compacts are first violated and then justified: the passions, when not kept under proper control, will ever hurry men on to transgress the limits of right reason.

    I hold friendship to be a very holy league, and no less than a piacle to infringe it. Howel.

    No violated leagues with sharp remorse Shall sting the conscious victor. Somerville.

    Why hast thou, Satan, broke the bounds pre-scrib'd To thy transgressions? Milton.


    INFRINGEMENT and INFRACTION, which are both derived from the Latin verb infringo or frango (v. To infringe), are employed according to the different senses of the verb infringe: the former being applied to the rights of individuals, either in their domestic or public capacity; and the latter rather to national transactions. Politeness, which teaches us what is due to every man in the smallest concerns, considers any unasked for interference in the private affairs of another as an infringement. Equity, which enjoins on nations as well as individuals, an attentive consideration to the interests of the whole forbids the infraction of a treaty in any case.

    - ENGLISH SYNONYMES EXPLAINED, IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER; WITH COPIOUS ILLUSTRATIONS AND EXAMPLES DRAWN FROM THE BEST WRITERS. BY GEORGE CRABB OF MAGDALEN HALL, OXFORD. SECOND EDITION, GREATLY ENLARGED AND CORRECTED. Sed cum idem frequentissime plura significent, quod ?????????? vooatur, jam sunt aliis alia honestiora, sublimiora, nitidiora, jucundiora, vocaliora. Quintil. Inst. Orat. lib. is. LONDON: PRINTED FOR BALDWIN, CRADOCK, AND JOY, 47, PATERNOSTER-ROW; AND T. BOOSEY, OLD BROAD-STREET. 1818. [Page 600]

I do believe that the Supreme Law states; "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall NOT be infringed", does it not? Then WHY is it being infringed upon? Is that not treason? For We The People, with our Constitution, ARE the sovereign authority. And treason is defined as;

    1: the betrayal of a trust : treachery.

    2: the offense of attempting by overt acts to overthrow the government of the state to which the offender owes allegiance or to kill or personally injure the sovereign or the sovereign's family.

Why is not the United States Supreme Court recognizing the remainder of the Amendment? They acknowledged the right in Heller, did they not? They agreed that it is the right of every American citizen in McDonald, correct? Then how is it the court cannot seem to comprehend the words; "shall NOT be infringed"? And even have gone so far as to [perversely] hold that the prior infringements are "constitutional"? How can that possibly be? Especially after one of the courts prior Chief Justices stated the following:

"More especially, it cannot be believed that the large slaveholding States regarded them as included in the word citizens, or would have consented to a Constitution which might compel them to receive them in that character from another State. For if they were so received, and entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens, it would exempt them from the operation of the special laws and from the police regulations which they considered to be necessary for their own safety. It would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognized as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased, singly or in companies, without pass or passport, and without obstruction, to sojourn there as long as they pleased, to go where they pleased at every hour of the day or night without molestation, unless they committed some violation of law for which a white man would be punished; and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went."--Mr. Chief Justice TANEY, U.S. Supreme Court, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).

 Could it be that they have combined in the ongoing conspiracy of the executive and legislative branches. And this, not only in the federal government, but also in many of the state governments as well. In order to continue in defrauding us of our inalienable natural right? The acknowledged right of ALL free citizens of America? It most certainly appears that way, doesn't it?

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